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AGE DISTINCTIONS AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
BERNICE L. NEUGARTEN*
Among social scientists and legal scholars an interest in the rela-
tionship between age and the law has been spurred by two recent legis-
lative actions of Congress. The first was the enactment of the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975.1 The ADA bars discrimination on the ba-
sis of age in any program receiving federal support if that program was
not explicitly aimed at a particular age group. The ADA applies across
the age spectrum, to both the young and the old.
The second action was the 1978 amendment to the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967.2 The original Act barred discrimi-
nation in the workplace for persons age 40 to 65. 3 The 1978 amend-
ment raised the protections to age 70,4 prohibited mandatory retire-
ment in the private sector before age 70,5 and prohibited mandatory
retirement altogether for most federal employees. 6
These two new laws come at a time when public concern over the
legal rights of children and adolescents, the so-called children's move-
ment, has been growing. With reference, then, to both the young and
the old, age rights constitute a new focus in the arena of civil rights, and
age, like race or gender or physical handicap, is coming into public
* Professor of Education and Sociology, Northwestern University. B.A., M.A., and Ph.D.,
University of Chicago.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-135, tit. III, §§ 301-308, 89 Stat. 728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)) [hereinafter referred to as the ADA]. The ADA provides:
Pursuant to regulations prescribed under section 6103 of this title ... no person in
the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
Id. § 6102.
As originally enacted, the ADA provided that no regulations promulgated for its enforcement
would be effective before January 1, 1979. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(5) (1976) (amended 1978). The
1978 amendments to the ADA extended that date to July i, 1979. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(5) (Supp.
III 1979). The United States Department of Health and Human Services subsequently promul-
gated regulations for the enforcement of the ADA. 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-90.62 (1980).
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92
Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976) (amended 1978).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. III 1979).
5. Id. § 623(0(2). This section provides that no seniority system or employee benefit plan
shall require or permit the involuntary retirement on the basis of age of any individual to whom
the Act applies.
6. Id. § 63 1(b). This section sets a lower limit of 40 years of age for the protected federal
employees listed in § 633(a) of the Act but sets no upper age limit.
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awareness as a dimension of human difference that calls for legal regu-
lation.
A few examples will delineate some of the issues. Under the regu-
lations promulgated by the United States Department of Health and
Human Services pursuant to the ADA, each federal agency which ex-
tends federal financial assistance to any program or activity is required
to conduct a review of the age distinctions it imposes on its recipients
by regulations, policies, and administrative practices in order to elimi-
nate those distinctions that are impermissible under the ADA. 7 Similar
steps are to be followed by all public and private agencies at the state
and local level that are recipients of federal funds.8 In the interpreta-
tion of the ADA made by the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices in formulating its regulations, major exceptions were permitted
which seem to water down the effects of the ADA. 9 The ADA is never-
theless an important step in setting forth the view that the age of the
beneficiary should not itself be a relevant characteristic in the distribu-
tion of public funds.
The problems are enormous in implementing the ADA and in de-
ciding what constitutes age discrimination.' 0 Is it discriminatory to-
ward younger people when special benefit programs like Medicare are
created for older people? And at the state level, is it discriminatory to
7. 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.32-90.34 (1980).
8. Id. §§ 90.41-90.50. Indeed, the regulations expressly state that the recipient agencies
have primary responsibility to insure that their programs and activities are in compliance with the
ADA. Id. § 90.42(a).
9. For example, 45 C.F.R. § 90.14 (1980) provides:
A recipient is permitted to take an action, otherwise prohibited by section 90.12, if
the action reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal opera-
tion or the achievement of any statutory objective of a program or activity. An action
reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal operation or the
achievement of any statutory objective of a program or activity, if:
(a) Age is used as a measure or approximation of one or more other characteris-
tics; and
(b) The other characteristic(s) must be measured or approximated in order for the
normal operation of the program or activity to continue, or to achieve any statutory
objective of the program or activity; and
(c) The other characteristic(s) can be reasonably measured or approximated by the
use of age; and
(d) The other characteristic(s) are impractical to measure directly on an individual
basis.
Similarly, 45 C.F.R. § 90.15 (1980) provides:
A recipient is permitted to take an action otherwise prohibited by section 90.12
which is based on a factor other than age, even though that action may have a dispropor-
tionate effect on persons of different ages. An action may be based on a factor other than
age only if the factor bears a direct and substantial relationship to the normal operation
of the program or activity or to the achievement of a statutory objective.
10. See Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law.- The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89
YALE L.J. 27 (1979).
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require a 65-year-old, but not a 64-year-old, to pass a vision test before
obtaining a driver's license or to allow a 16-year-old, but not a 15-year-
old, to drive an automobile? Such distinctions are presently legal, but
they may come to be regarded as unjust or inequitable as the ADA
adds to a rising public consciousness about age distinctions and age
rights.
Another example is one that deals with the young and with
changes in legal definitions of maturity. A California law passed in
1979, known as the Emancipation of Minors Act," is designed to help
teen-agers who have fled intolerable family situations. Children who
are at least 14 can be declared independent of their parents and, if they
are living away from home and supporting themselves, can receive the
right to be treated for most legal purposes as adults.' 2 A similar law
was passed in Connecticut in 1979 whereby minors 16 and older who
are seeking emancipation can petition the Superior Court for Juvenile
Matters. 13 If the court finds that they are capable of supporting them-
selves and are willingly living apart from their parents, they may be
declared legally emancipated.' 4 These two laws are significant exam-
ples of changing attitudes towards age distinctions and concepts of ma-
turity.
Implicitly or explicitly, these illustrations involve many of the is-
sues that intrigue social scientists who turn their attention to age and
the law. Attempts to analyze the interactions of law and society rest on
two fundamental premises: that legal systems exist within an encom-
passing sociocultural system and that much of the social fabric is wo-
ven together with the threads of legal license and mandate.15 These
tenets reflect the further understanding that the legal system and other
social systems interact in mutually determining ways. Embedded in
that interaction are a number of common issues such as legitimation,
authority, social change, the nature of consensus, and conflict resolu-
tion. These general points need no elaboration here. But it happens
that, with a few notable exceptions, social scientists have given little
attention to such issues as they bear upon questions of age and the
law. ' 6
1I. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 60-70 (West 1980).
12. Id §64.
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-150 to 46b-150e (West Supp. 1981).
14. Id § 46b-150b.
15. See L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1975); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
16. See H. PRATr, THE GRAY LOBBY (1976); Cain, Aging and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF
AGING AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 342 (1976); CottreU, GovernmentalFunctions and the Politics of
Age, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY 624 (C. Tibbitts ed. 1960); Hudson & Binstock,
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The first set of questions that arise for social scientists relate to
changing social values and attitudes with regard to age distinctions,
how age distinctions become formalized in the legal system, and how
legal decisions, whether statutory, regulatory, or judicial, shape these
attitudes.
Another set of questions relate to the use of age as a proxy for
some other attribute which is deemed significant in making distinctions
between members of society. In the case of the emancipation of mi-
nors, that attribute might be called social maturity. In the case of
mandatory retirement, it might be called incompetence in the work-
place. When is it reasonable to use age as a proxy? What is the scien-
tific evidence that age is reliably related to the attribute under
discussion? When age is used as a proxy, at what particular ages are
the distinctions to be drawn? In the emancipation of minors, why is 14
the age of eligibility in California, but 16 in Connecticut? And in the
example of mandatory retirement, why is it permissible to retire per-
sons above but not those below age 70?
A special set of questions arise in determining discrimination
under the ADA. Here, discrimination does not relate to an age distinc-
tion per se, but to the age distribution of persons served by a given
government program when compared to the age distribution of the
population eligible for the service. How much discrepancy between the
two age distributions constitutes discrimination?
An additional set of questions relate to the individual versus the
group. When is it reasonable to treat the individual as a member of the
age group to which he belongs, and when must individual differences
be respected? For example, in the emancipation of minors, it is only
certain 16-year-olds, those who can demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the court that they are economically independent, who are given free-
dom from parents. Yet, in the situation of mandatory retirement, it has
been held equitable to retire a person who is performing satisfactorily
merely because it can be shown that in the population at large certain
Political Systems and Aging, in HANDBOOK OF AGING AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 369 (1976);
Schmidhauser, Age and Judicial Behavior. American Higher Appellate Judges, in POLITICS OF AGE
101 (1962) [hereinafter referred to as Age and Judicial Behavior ]; Cain, The Growing Importance of
Legal Age in Determining the Status of the Elderly, 14 GERONTOLOGIST 167 (1974) [hereinafter
referred to as Growing Importance]; Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity." 4 View of the Legal
Conception ofGrowing Up andLetting Go, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 78 (1975); L. Cain, Counting
Backward From Projected Death: An Alternative to Chronological Age in Assigning Status to the
Elderly (March 22, 1978) (paper presented at a conference of the Policy Center on Aging, Syra-
cuse University); J. Schmidhauser, Changing Age Structure of American Political Leadership
(1977) (paper presented at the 30th Annual Meeting of the Gerontological Society, San Francisco,
Cal.).
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types of intellectual decline appear in persons over 70.17 In the first
instance, the law is saying that not every 16-year-old is the same. But
in the second instance, the law is saying, in effect, that every 70-year-
old is the same.
The lawyer will recognize that such questions relate directly to
various legal issues such as whether or not issues of constitutional
rights are involved, what are the bases for redress, what is the definition
of suspect classes, when is the strict scrutiny or the minimum rational-
ity standard to be used in judicial review, what are the questions of due
process and equal protection under the law, when are categories of per-
sons over- or under-inclusive, when are conclusive presumptions oper-
ating, and what is prima facie evidence of discrimination. And
obviously enough, issues of social equity and justice under the law un-
derlie all the questions raised here. But analyses of the legal, philo-
sophical, and ethical doctrines lie beyond the scope of this paper. The
comments which follow are addressed to only a few of the social sci-
ence questions. The intent is first to describe, in broad strokes, the so-
cial processes which give rise to age distinctions and age
discriminations, then to illustrate briefly a few of the problems in deter-
mining discrimination, and in doing so, to indicate some of the ways in
which social scientists and legal scholars come together in pursuing is-
sues of age and the law.
AGE-STATUS SYSTEMS
To the anthropologist and the sociologist, age is a major dimen-
sion of social organization. To the psychologist, it is a major dimension
by which the individual organizes his life course and interprets his life
experience. The age organization of society is a socially and psycho-
logically meaningful system. It is within this system that age distinc-
tions are created and age discrimination arises.
All societies rationalize the passage of life time, divide life time
into socially relevant units, and thus transform biological time into
social time. Certain biological or social events come to be regarded as
significant punctuation marks in the life course and to signify the tran-
sition points from one age status to the next. Thus, to take a familiar
example, puberty is regarded in some societies as the event which
marks the entry into adulthood, and elaborate rites depassage mark its
importance. In other societies like our own, puberty carries little signif-
icance with regard to age status, and entry into adulthood is marked
17. See Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979).
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instead by marriage and parenthood or by the achievement of eco-
nomic independence.
In all societies, age-status systems emerge in which rights, rewards
and responsibilities are differentially distributed to socially defined age
groups. Life periods in the lives of individuals become parallel with
age grades in the society; and age grades in turn constitute an age-strat-
ification structure.' 8
In societies where the division of labor is simple and the rate of
social change is slow, a single over-arching age-status system may
emerge in which family, work, political, and religious roles are syn-
chronized, allocated, and regulated according to the individual's posi-
tion in the age structure.
To call attention to such age-graded societies is not to equate a
simple society with a modern industrial society, but to help clarify the
functions of age distinctions. Thus, in some East African societies,
males born over a given period of time are assigned membership in a
given age-set and then proceed as a group from one age-grade to the
next. In one such society there are six overlapping age-grades after
childhood: the junior warrior or "youth," occupied by males aged 14 to
23; the senior warrior, occupied from about 20 to 30; the learning elder
status, from 14 until the oldest child is to be circumcised; the junior
elder status; the senior elder status; and the priestly status. Men move
from warrior to elder status when they marry; they reach priestly status
only when all their children are circumcised and when they no longer
have wives of childbearing age. 19
Age-grades and age-status systems are built upon functional age.
That is, as the individual's physical, mental, and social competencies
change over time, he is able to carry out different social functions.
Those competencies are utilized and systematized in the interests of the
society at large. Social age distinctions appear, therefore, because they
are inherently functional to the society.
In modern, complex societies, plural systems of age-status arise,
also based on perception of functional age, but are differentiated in
relation to particular social institutions. These multiple systems make
use of the common index of chronological age, but age distinctions
vary in the extent to which they become explicit and formal. Age-grad-
ing in a typical American school, for instance, is much more formal
18. See 3 M. RILEY, M. JOHNSON -& A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY-A SOCIOLOGY OF
AGE STRATIFICATION (1972).
19. See A. PRINS, EAST AFRICAN AGE-CLASS SYSTEMS (1953); Gulliver, Age Differentiation,
in I INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 157 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
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than in the typical American family. Social age definitions may be in-
consistent from one institutional setting to the next, as in the case when
persons marry and become parents and are therefore considered adult
in the family system, but at the same time continue in school and are
not yet adult in the economic system. In modem societies, then, age-
role transitions are often asynchronous.
Any age system, whether in a simple or a complex society, thus
performs two functions. For the individual, it establishes a series of
social positions that provides clarity and predictability, regular move-
ment from lower to higher rungs of the age-status ladder, and a certain
coherence as new role patterns are automatically assigned with increas-
ing age. For the society, it provides for an effective division of labor, in
the broadest sense of that term, thereby establishing a social mecha-
nism for maintaining the economy, the educational system, the family
system, and the military, political, and religious systems.
Age Distinctions and Age Norms
Age status systems, by definition, create age distinctions, and along
with them, a pattern of norms and expectations regarding age-appro-
priate behavior. Age norms vary in the degree to which they are for-
malized and in the strength of the sanctions attached to them. Some
operate on the basis of informal consensus; others are stipulated in the
laws. In both instances they are mechanisms of social control.
It might be noted, parenthetically, that age norms form a network
of expectations that pervade the whole cultural fabric. Men and wo-
men are aware of the social clocks that operate in various areas of their
lives and they are aware of their own timing. In our society, people
readily describe themselves as being early, late, or on time with regard
to family and occupational events. In different words, age norms act as
prods and brakes upon behavior, in some instances hastening a life
event, in other instances delaying it. But age norms also operate in
more peripheral areas of life, as when a woman is told, "You're too old
to be working so hard," or a man is told, "You're too young to dress
like that." Adults as well as children are constantly exhorted to act
their age.
Although social scientists have given relatively little attention to
age norms, there are at least a few studies that demonstrate a high de-
gree of consensus with regard to age-appropriate behaviors, with com-
mon patterns of approval and disapproval expressed by representative
groups of adults. It also appears that young persons perceive more age
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constraints operating in the society than do middle-aged or older peo-
ple, a finding that parallels the fact that a great number of laws exist
that regulate the rights and responsibilities of young people. 20 Finally,
in this connection, there are sets of data indicating that age norms and
age constraints may, at least in some ways, be losing their saliency as
regulators of the life course2' at the same time that age distinctions are
increasing in the law.
Historical Change
Age status systems become altered over time as they reflect other
kinds of social changes. For example, with increased longevity, the
timing of the life course has changed. Historians say that in Western
societies it was not until the 17th and 18th centuries, with the growth of
industrialization, the appearance of a middle class, and the emergence
of formal educational institutions, that childhood became a discernible
period of life, one with special needs and characteristics. 22 The concept
of adolescence took on its present meaning in the last part of the 19th
century, but became a widespread concept only in the 20th century.23
A new stage called youth has emerged in the last few decades as the
transition from adolescence to adulthood has been prolonged.24 And
in the second half of the life course, there is now a delineated period
called middle age;25 and more recently still, the recognition that the
young-old should be differentiated from the old-old.26
As the United States has moved from the agrarian to the industri-
alized, from small town to metropolis, there have been other alterations
in our age-status systems. The family cycle may be said to have quick-
ened as marriage, parenthood, and grandparenthood occur earlier now
than in 1900, but as widowhood occurs later. In our economic institu-
tions, points of entry and exit from the labor market are differently
20. See Neugarten, Moore & Lowe, Age Norms, Age Constraints, and Adult Socialization, 70
AM. J. Soc. 710 (1965).
21. See P. Passuth, Continuity and Change in Age Norms and Age Constraints (April 15,
1981) (unpublished paper in Northwestern University Department of Sociology Library); R. Sills,
H. Zepelin & M. Brill, Age Norms: 1960s and 1980s Compared (Nov. 14, 1980) (paper presented
at the 33d Annual Meeting of the Gerontological Society, San Diego, Cal.).
22. See P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (1962).
23. See J. GILLIS, YOUTH AND HISTORY (1974); Demos & Demos, Adolescence in Historical
Perspective, 31 J. MARR. & FAM. 632 (1969).
24. See PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMM., PANEL ON YOUTH, YOUTH: TRANSITION
TO ADULTHOOD (1973); Keniston, Youth: A New Stage of Life, 39 AM. SCHOLAR 631 (1970).
25. See Neugarten, The Awareness of Middle Age, in MIDDLE AGE AND AGING: A READER
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 93 (B. Neugarten ed. 1968).
26. See Neugarten, Age Groups in American Society and the Rise ofthe Young-Old, 415 AN-
NALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 187 (1974).
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timed as the growth of technology and the lengthened period of educa-
tion have led to a delay, particularly for men, in reaching maturity, and
as the trend toward earlier retirement has led to an earlier old age as
socially defined. In our political institutions, maturity now comes ear-
lier, with the eligibility to vote at 18 rather than 21. And there has been
a proliferation of laws relating to pensions, housing, and medical and
social services for older persons that, as some have described it, are
creating a separate status for the old.27
Social lags and social strains are often reflected in age-status sys-
tems, and social and legal age definitions that have been functional in
one period of history may become dysfunctional in another. To take
another example from an African society: There may be times when,
to create a group large enough to be functional in the society, the limits
of an age-set are widened. When such an age-set reaches the point of
becoming junior elders, it may include, as anticipated, men of mar-
riageable age, but it may also include other men who, if the rules of the
system were to be followed, would have been held back from marriage
and parenthood. This would create intolerable strains both for the in-
dividuals involved and for the whole community.28 Or, when such a
society comes into contact with a western culture and many young men
move to the city in search of jobs, there are too few males left in the
village to carry out the essential social tasks. As a result, the rules of
the age-status system are changed to accommodate such situations.
The same general principle operates in more complex societies. In
the United States, the presence of large numbers of vigorous older per-
sons, together with the changes in the economy that motivate them to
continue in the labor market, produce pressures for change in the sys-
tems that -regulate retirement. Modifications in the law, as in the
ADEA amendment mentioned earlier, constitute change in the age-sta-
tus system. Another example, also mentioned earlier, is the lowered
age of voting. The appearance of large numbers of politically active
young people in the late 1960s, their presumed greater maturity as com-
pared to preceding generations, and the fact that 18-year-olds were in
the armed forces but were being denied the franchise until age 21-
itself an excellent example of the asynchronous nature of our age sys-
tems-led to the 26th amendment. Lowering the voting age to 18 was a
change in the rules regarding age status. Still another example arises in
27. See Growing Importance, supra note 16.
28. See Foner & Kertzer, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Sources of Change in Life-Course Transi-
tions, in AGING FROM BIRTH TO DEATH 121 (M. Riley ed. 1979).
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the present public debate over legalized abortion, where some of the
arguments turn on the issue of the age at which a fetus becomes a "per-
son" with rights to legal protection.
In all three examples--the first related to the economy, the second
to the political system, and the third to the family-the questions are
the same: How and where should an age distinction be created? When
does an age distinction become age discrimination?
These points can be summarized as follows: Functional age be-
comes transformed into social age, and social ages into age distinctions.
A pervasive network of age norms and age expectations becomes a sys-
tem of social control. Some age distinctions become formalized in the
laws. In a bureaucratic society like our own, chronological age be-
comes the index of social age and is used as the proxy for functional
age. As the age-status system adapts to other forms of social change,
various chronological ages imbedded in the laws lose their original
value. Some become outmoded; others become discriminatory in the
views of legislators, administrators, and the courts.
New Images of Old Age
Perceptions of age groups are reflected in the social policies of a
modem society, and therefore in the laws. These perceptions, as al-
ready implied, relate to the size of an age-status group and to the char-
acteristics perceived to be common to members of that group. These
issues are taking on new importance in the 1980s with regard to old
age. Who is to be regarded as old? What should be the lower age
boundary? And because of what characteristics? These are very real
questions in political decision-making and in the formulation of gov-
ernment policies and programs. 29
In the past several decades there has been an image of older peo-
ple as persons in need. Thus, there are the programs of Supplementary
Security Income, Medicare, senior centers, and publicly subsidized
housing. All these are legal expressions of the view that older persons
are economically disadvantaged, physically ill or vulnerable, dimin-
ished in intellectual and social competence, and therefore deserving of
special concern and protection.
At the same time, there is the view, based on equally compelling
sets of data, that most older people are healthy and active and rela-
tively comfortable financially; that they constitute a major resource in
29. See generally How Old Is "Old"? The Effects OfAging On Learning And Working: Hear-
ing Before the Sen. Special Comm on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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the nation's economic and community life; and that the policy goal is,
therefore, to remove constraints which affect their employment and cre-
ate various other forms of social segregation.
This disparity of images is well illustrated in the rising debate over
changes in the social security system. The social security program be-
gan with the premise that it is appropriate and socially desirable for
persons to retire at age 65. But the present trend toward abolishing
mandatory retirement, and the view that the right to continue to work
is a civil right, are based on a contrary premise-that it is appropriate
and desirable to prolong the work life of older people.
To take another example: The establishment of senior centers, nu-
trition sites and elderly housing projects are based on the premise that
at least a certain degree of age segregation is reasonable and even desir-
able. At the same time, such programs as Foster Grandparents or
Elderhostels are promoted as a means of combating age segregation.
An even more telling example is the paradox that exists within a single
law. The 1978 amendments to the Older Americans Act confirmed the
age-categorical programs established under that Act, but at the same
time added a general prohibition against age discrimination.
If cohesive and rational policies are to be created in the 1980s re-
garding government responsibility for older people, these disparate
images will need to be reconciled. One astute observer has delineated
three alternatives. 30 The first stems from the view that age itself is a
poor predictor of the adult's capacity, circumstance, or need. Like gen-
der or race, age does not determine health, marital status, economic
status, or intellectual or social competence. If the role of government is
to provide opportunities commensurate with the individual's abilities
and services commensurate with the individual's needs, then programs
should be age-neutral rather than age-categorical. Efforts should be
targeted at various needy groups rather than at the old as a group. 31
This view, sometimes called the "age-irrelevant" view, would lead
to laws that eliminate age discrimination not only in employment prac-
tices, but in credit practices, professional licensing and other public reg-
ulatory activities; to age desegregation of publicly subsidized housing;
to the conversion of age-based tax exemptions and income transfer pro-
grams into income-based eligibility; and to the conversion of Medicare
30. D. Nelson, Observations on Current and Future Bases for Effective National Policy Ad-
vocacy on Behalf of Older People (Sept. 15, 1980) (paper prepared for the Federal Council on
Aging, Washington, D.C.).
31. See Neugarten, Policyfor the 1980s." Age or Need Entitlement?, in AGING: AGENDA FOR
THE EIGHTIES 48 (1979).
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into an income-based program like Medicaid or a national health in-
surance program that would cover persons of all ages. Under this view,
the goal is to mainstream older people into the larger society; to move
away, wherever possible, from the use of age as a proxy; and to move to
direct measures of competence or need.
The second alternative is to redefine old age by moving it up to age
75, and to work toward synchronization of the laws in this respect.
Thus, instead of the multiple definitions that now exist in the statutes, a
single definition would be the basis for special benefits and protections.
Such a policy would reaffirm the notion that there is an increased fre-
quency of economic, social, and health needs, as well as an increased
prevalence of frailty and impairment, in persons over 75, and that pro-
grams should be tailored accordingly. This position would lead to laws
prohibiting mandatory retirement until age 75, and laws based on 75 as
the age of eligibility for Medicare, subsidized housing, and subsidized
social services. Under this alternative, chronological age would still be
used as the proxy for need, and the problem of how to avoid an over-
or under-inclusive age group would remain, a point which will be dis-
cussed below.
The third alternative is called veteranship and is based on the view
that old age is an earned status that should provide special rewards and
benefits. This alternative recognizes the value of long life experience.
Because older persons have contributed throughout their lives to the
good of society as parents, workers and community supporters, old age
should become the occasion for the community's repayment. Older
people are a group who deserve special respect, enhanced authority and
prestige. They should be given the status of elders, in the best sense of
that term.
In providing a full range of life options for older people, and an
end to age segregation and age discrimination, the goal is much the
same as in the "age-irrelevant" position. The difference is that the
veteranship view would lead to a wide array of laws creating special
benefit programs for older people. Chronological age would still be the
basis for eligibility, and the problem would remain of determining
what particular chronological age should denote admission to the status
of veteran or elder.
These alternative views of old age provide a timely example of
how perceptions of age groups are changing, and how such changes
affect the laws. It remains to be seen which of these views will become
the prevailing one in the decade ahead.
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DISTINCTIONS AND DISCRIMINATIONS UNDER THE LAW
As is true in other areas, the laws that establish age distinctions are
sometimes proscriptive, sometimes prescriptive, and sometimes permis-
sive. They pervade most areas of life, including the allocation of public
resources, the extension and denial of benefits, the imposition of legal
burdens, and the relaxation of legal responsibilities. There are other
familiar examples. The age of the perpetrator, or even that of the vic-
tim, is sometimes an element of a criminal offense; state laws bar the
hiring of police officers or firemen over age 35; public schools may bar
3-year-olds; and zoning laws may exclude children, thus creating com-
munities that are only for the elderly. Special legal protections exist for
the young and the old, as in guardianship cases where the principle of
parenspatriae32 is invoked.
The Pervasiveness Of The Law
That age distinctions are embodied in the laws is not surprising;
however, the extent to which such laws create a system of social control
has seldom been documented. A study conducted twenty-seven years
ago illustrates one type of research that would be enlightening, research
that today, given the advent of the computer, might be more easily un-
dertaken. In 1954, an analysis of the Illinois laws containing references
to age disclosed 178 such statutes. 33 Nearly 75 percent of those laws
referred to the years of life from birth through age 21. Most of them
aimed at the protection of children, and, as might be expected, most of
them dealt with the provision of physical care and education, the prohi-
bition of child labor, and responsibility for criminal offenses. Those
statutes that referred to ages 16 to 21 were usually enabling in nature,
providing for adult participation in the society. There were very few
laws dealing with the years between 22 and 50. Of the 20 percent of the
statutes that referred to ages above 50, most dealt with pensions or age
of retirement in various occupations, or with protections for frail older
persons. While this 1954 study of Illinois law may be dated, it is still
noteworthy, for it indicates the pervasive role of the law in creating and
maintaining the age-status system.
32. Parens pariae refers to the role of the state as the sovereign and guardian of persons
under a legal disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
33. L. Evans, Legal Definition of Age as Contained in Illinois Statute Law (Aug. 1954) (un-
published master's degree thesis in University of Chicago Library).
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Changes In The Legal Culture
It has been noted above that alterations in age-status accompany
other types of social change. As is true of the family or the economy,
changes in the legal system itself and in the culture that surrounds it
affect the extent to which age distinctions become formalized in the
law. The scope of due process under the law has been broadened in
this country over the past few decades. More people now have a voice
about more things that come before the courts, and the courts have
confirmed some rights that formerly did not exist. New branches of the
law have emerged, such as consumer law and environmental law, and
civil rights law has been applied to new situations. New forums have
emerged for the community's intervention in governmental and court
decisions.
There has been an increase in the use of the law as a means of
social control. Not only have levels of legal activity risen, but percep-
tions and attitudes about the law have shifted. We have been witness-
ing the appearance of the so-called litigious society, in which
individuals increasingly turn to the courts for the resolution of conflicts
that would earlier have been resolved privately.
Again, research is lacking with regard to the effects of these
changes on the age-status system, but the two statutes mentioned at the
beginning of this paper, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and the Age Discrimination Act, are good examples of how the legal
system now governs new areas of life and how it operates to sharpen
age distinctions and discriminations.
Age As a Proxy
In discussing the pervasiveness of the laws regarding age, a paral-
lel point which should be noted is that age is used as a proxy for a wide
range of characteristics such as intellectual and emotional maturity
(e.g., minimum ages for entering school), readiness to assume adult re-
sponsibilities (e.g., minimum ages for voting, drinking, driving and
marriage), physical strength or speed of response (e.g., maximum ages
for policemen, bus drivers, or air-line pilots), economic productivity
(e.g., age of retirement), and various types of debility (e.g., ages for
eligibility for medical services and social services).
The use of age as a proxy has a major advantage and a major
disadvantage. The advantage is that age is a classic example of a "for-
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mally realizable rule."' 34 That is, there is little or no discretion needed
in determining how to apply it. Either a person is 18 years old or he is
not. Thus, the use of age takes on new social functions in a bureau-
cratic society. It makes decision-making easier for law-makers and
government officials, as well as for judges. It is less costly than using
more individualized assessments of functional age. Expediency and
cost-effectiveness are important social values.
The major disadvantage is that the validity of using age as a proxy
depends upon the correspondence between age and the characteristic
for which it stands, and the presumed correspondence often is not
based on good evidence, but on age stereotypes (e.g., it is often pre-
sumed that most older people are poor, but in fact, the proportion of
older people who are poor is not much different from the proportion of
younger people who are poor). Furthermore, to use age as a proxy
means to use particular ages as cut-off points. The age classifications
that result are then under-inclusive (some 14-year-olds are as mature as
the 16-year-olds who are permitted to drive) or over-inclusive (not all
65-year-olds are in need of tax relief).
Thus, the use of age as a proxy involves a trade-off between differ-
ent social values--expediency versus accuracy. The extent to which a
category is over- or under-inclusive is an important determinant of the
constitutionality of legal classifications. But an imperfect classification
may be allowed to stand if, in the eyes of the law, it is based on some
degree of rationality or "reasonableness." Thus, it is a legitimate inter-
est of the state to ensure a vigorous judiciary; and it is regarded as
reasonable that because persons over 70 are usually less vigorous than
younger persons, judges should be retired at age 70. There are some-
times dramatic differences between the legal definition of reasonable-
ness, the social scientist's definition (as based on evidence of individual
differences), and the social ethicist's definition (as based on the rights of
individuals).
Discrepant Age Distributions
Age discrimination is an elusive enough concept when it relates to
an age distinction. But it is also elusive when, as under the ADA, dis-
crimination relates to age distributions: that is, when the age distribu-
tion of beneficiaries in a given program is compared to the age
34. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
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distribution of the eligible population in determining whether the two
distributions are congruent.
When the ADA was first passed in 1975, Congress recognized that
the extent of age discrimination in federal programs was unknown. It
instructed the Commission on Civil Rights to undertake a study of the
matter, saying that, in the tight of the findings, the ADA would be
amended as necessary and then implemented. The Commission on
Civil Rights studied ten major programs and concluded that age dis-
crimination was present in all of them, sometimes with regard to
younger groups, and sometimes with regard to older persons.35 This
method of comparing distributions is, however, only a first step in de-
termining discrimination. For if differences occur, it still must be de-
cided if the discrimination is real or only apparent. Thus, the second
step is to determine if the observed disparity is justifiable or not. This
requires a value judgement. For instance, it is well known that older
people constitue 11 percent of the population of the United States, but
that they utilize more than 30 percent of all health expenditures. This
fact is not usually regarded as discriminatory toward younger people
because it can be demonstrated that older people more often suffer
from ill health and therefore have greater need of health services.
This is the problem that arises at the operational level under the
ADA. It is the same kind of problem that often arises in cases of al-
leged race or sex discrimination, where, for example, a whole array of
data dealing with the hiring practices of a company as a whole is often
scrutinized for evidence of discrimination rather than just the specific
data regarding a particular plaintiff.
In relation to the ADA, a study by the Urban Institute focused on
the Vocational Rehabilitation Program, one of the programs cited by
the Commission on Civil Rights. 36 In this instance, older persons were
underrepresented among programs beneficiaries. But in analyzing the
data further, there are many factors which can be construed as reason-
able bases for differential treatment. One factor is the source of refer-
ral. Younger clients are more often referred by educational institutions
while older clients are referred by physicians. Many physicians believe
older disabled persons should not work, and therefore do not refer
them to the program. Another factor is that interactions between fed-
eral programs themselves affect the number of persons who apply.
35. U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY (PART 1) (1977).
36. See M. GUTowsmu & J. KOSHEL, METHODS FOR ASSESSING AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1977).
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Many older persons, if successfully rehabilitated so that they become
able to work, would lose other federal benefits. Other older persons are
reluctant to be rehabilitated for lower-paying jobs than those they had
earlier. Still another factor relates to outcomes, whereby there may be
greater difficulty in placing an older worker after rehabilitation than a
younger disabled worker. If equal numbers of older persons were to be
served under the program, the cost-benefit ratio for the program would
be unfavorable.
Thus, the determination of discrimination becomes as complex
here as in the first category. Whether the question relates to a particu-
lar age distinction or to a distribution of beneficiaries, there is a wide
area of discretion left to the administrators who write the regulations
and the judges who make the decisions. Over the long term, the deci-
sions will reflect the value patterns of the society and the perceptions of
age groups that prevail at a given time in history.
Age distinctions of more subtle types can also arise from the ten-
dency of those in the legal system to perceive age groups in stereotyped
ways. These age-based stereotypes may influence legal decisions in a
variety of covert ways.37 These issues, like some of the others men-
tioned above, have seldom been studied. They are worthy of the re-
search efforts of both social scientists and legal scholars.
CONCLUSION
This paper has dealt with only a small number of the issues and
the complexities that face us in considering age distinctions, age dis-
criminations, and the law. A case may be made that age is becoming
an increasingly significant dimension of social organization. The
changing demography is one contributing factor, but there are other
factors. Some believe that age segregation is growing, although this
itself is not a simple question. Bureaucracy brings with it the increas-
ing use of age in sorting and sifting people. There are increasing num-
bers of government programs aimed at the young and at the old, and
age criteria are increasingly being codified into law. Age is becoming
accentuated in the formation of political interest groups. Age and the
law will become an important area for scholarship as well as legal prac-
tice. It is to be hoped that students of society and students of the law
will join together in helping this field to grow.
37. See Age and Judicial Behavior, supra note 16.

